The E-Word - On the Public Acceptance of Experiments by Fischer, Mira et al.
The E-Word  On the Public Acceptance of
Experiments
Mira Fischer (WZB Berlin)
Elisabeth Grewenig (ifo Institute)
Philipp Lergetporer (ifo Institute)
Katharina Werner (ifo Institute)
Discussion Paper No. 219
December 16, 2019
Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 | www.rationality-and-competition.de
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München | Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Spokesperson: Prof. Dr. Klaus M. Schmidt, University of Munich, 80539 Munich, Germany
+49 (89) 2180 3405 | info@rationality-and-competition.de
1 
The E-Word – On the Public Acceptance of  
Experiments
*
 
Mira Fischer, Elisabeth Grewenig, Philipp Lergetporer, and Katharina Werner
 †
 
Abstract 
Randomized experiments are often viewed as the “gold standard” of scientific evidence but 
people’s scepticism towards experiments has compromised their viability in the past. We 
study preferences for experimental policy evaluations in a representative survey in Germany 
(N>1,900). We find that a majority of 75% supports the idea of small-scale evaluations of 
policies before enacting them at a large scale. Experimentally varying whether the 
evaluations are explicitly described as “experiments” has a precisely estimated overall zero 
effect on public support. Our results indicate political leeway for experimental policy 
evaluation, a practice that is still uncommon in Germany. 
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1. Introduction 
Randomized experiments are often referred to as the “gold standard” of scientific evidence 
(e.g., Abadie and Cattaneo 2018) and their implementation in naturally occurring contexts 
has been greatly increasing over the last two decades (Baldassarri and Abascal 2017). They 
have evolved from mostly small-scale proof-of-concept studies (Lupia 2002, Grose 2014), to 
experimentation as program evaluation in the field, to experimentation as an approach to 
governing, including but not limited to public policy (Huitema 2018). The experimental turn 
in policy-making is evidenced by the increasing commonness of government advisors with a 
background in experimental social science
1
 and the OECD’s promotion of policy experiments 
(OECD 2019). Education is a particularly important field in which randomized controlled 
trials are proliferating and helping to improve policy (Sadoff 2014, Connolly 2018). 
At the same time, backlash from political decision-makers, bureaucrats, study 
participants, the public at large, and other stakeholders can compromise the viability of 
randomized field experiments (e.g., Heckman and Smith 1995, Krueger 1999, Angrist and 
Lavy 2009). A case in point is the paper by Angrist and Lavy (2002), which reports that an 
experiment offering cash incentives for students was suspended after “extensive and mostly 
critical media coverage” (p. 11).2 While the public’s acceptance of experiments is crucial for 
their feasibility, little systematic evidence exists on the extent and determinants of people’s 
support for field experiments. 
In this paper, we investigate the public’s preferences for reform evaluation and test the 
hypothesis that explicitly describing an evaluation as an “experiment” triggers public 
backlash. Such negative reactions might be due to several reasons. The word “experiment” 
may make citizens think of past unethical or even criminal studies that have been referred to 
as “experiments” (e.g., the crimes against humanity committed by Nazi doctors during World 
War II)
3
, it might also trigger concerns about policy uncertainty, as exemplified by the 
successful 1957 federal-election campaign slogan “Keine Experimente!” (“No 
                                                 
1
 These advisors often form so called “behavioral insights” teams that tend to focus on marketing-inspired 
experiments around social influence and less on program or policy evaluation. Behavioral insights teams started 
proliferating ten years ago, and especially since 2015, in, for example, Australia, Canada, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S. (World Bank Group 2018). 
2
 More recent examples for experiments facing strong public condemnation after their implementation 
include the Facebook newsfeed experiment (Kramer et al. 2014, Goel 2014) or the matching score experiment 
of the dating platform OKCupid (Hern 2014, Hawver 2014), although the sites only implemented what is wide-
spread practice on the internet (Christian 2012). 
3
 These horrific crimes led to the creation of the Nuremberg Code of 1947, a code of research ethics for 
medical experimentation with human subjects (see also List 2008). Another example for harmful experiments 
are the medical and radiation studies conducted in the 1940s to 1960s in the United States (Conahan 1994). 
3 
Experiments!”) of Germany’s chancellor Konrad Adenauer.4 Finally, the word “experiment” 
might prime reportedly unpopular features of field experiments – such the use of 
randomization, denial of treatment to control-group members (e.g., Heckman and Smith 
1995), or lack of informed consent (e.g., List 2008). Anecdotal evidence shows that 
experimental economists often avoid the word “experiment” when communicating their 
research because they fear that using the word may yield a backlash. If merely avoiding the 
word “experiment” can foster the political feasibility of field experiments, altered 
communication strategies could make conducting field experiments much easier and mitigate 
some governments’ reluctance to use them.5  
We conduct a survey experiment among a representative sample of the German voting-
age population (N>1,900) in which respondents are randomly assigned to one of two versions 
of a question on preferences for reform evaluation. Focusing on education policy, the 
baseline version of the question describes the evaluation process without explicitly 
mentioning the word “experiment”. In the treatment group, we used the exact same wording 
as in the control group with the sole exception that the evaluation process is described as 
“with experiments”. If the German public takes an instant dislike against the word 
“experiment”, then support for evaluating educational reforms should be substantially smaller 
in the treatment group where “experiments” are mentioned.  
We have two main findings. First, a clear majority of the German public supports the 
idea of evaluating education reforms before rolling them out at a large scale: 75 percent are in 
favour of the proposal and only 14 percent oppose it (the remaining 11 percent are 
indifferent). This widespread support does not vary significantly across sociodemographic 
subgroups, with the exception of females (more patient respondents) who are significantly 
less (more) supportive of reform evaluations.  
Second, using the word “experiment” to describe reform evaluations has a precisely 
estimated zero causal effect on overall public support for education policy evaluation. 
Treatment effects are very small (1 to 2 percentage points, depending on the specification) 
and statistically insignificant. Given our relatively large sample size, our ex-post minimum 
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 The slogan was used by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and referred to the risk that the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) would leave the NATO in case of electoral victory. 
5
 While feared public backlash is a likely reason for why governments are sometimes reluctant to adopt 
field experiments for policy evaluation, a complementary reason highlighted in the political-economy literature 
is that politicians often do not have an interest in finding out whether their policies have the intended effects 
(Campbell 1969). 
4 
detectable effect size (MDE) is 5 to 6 percentage points, which leaves us well-powered to 
rule out any effects for the overall German population.  
Explorative subgroup analyses do not reveal heterogeneities in the treatment effect for 
different sociodemographic subgroups (defined along the lines of e.g. education, income, or 
parental status). However, they suggest heterogeneities along political party affiliation as left-
wing supporters are significantly less likely to support reform evaluation when the word 
“experiment” is used to describe the evaluation process, whereas respondents with other 
political orientations are unaffected by the treatment. 
We do not find treatment effect heterogeneities by response time or survey mode, 
which suggests that effects are unlikely due to inattention. In sum, our results reveal broad 
support for the idea to evaluate education reforms before enacting them. This support is 
generally unaffected by framing this practice as “experiment”, however different political 
parties possibly face different political constraints when it comes to communicating policy 
experimentation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, our results suggest that the German 
population is not in general averse to the use of the word “experiment” when referring to the 
scientific evaluation of education policies. While our results speak to the language 
conventions around scientific policy evaluation, no conclusions can be drawn from them 
about public attitudes towards the use of different methods, in particular randomization, in 
policy evaluation. 
Germany’s political institutions may offer particularly good conditions for 
experimentation and learning to address a variety of social and economic problems because 
of their high degree of decentralization (Oates 1999), including in the area of general 
education. However, compared to, for instance, the Finnish government that declared that it 
wants Finland to become “the world’s best environment for innovating and experimenting by 
2025”6 and several other developed countries (World Bank Group 2018), German politicians 
have been rather reluctant to embrace experimental policy evaluation. In 2015, a three-person 
unit named “Wirksam Regieren” (“Governing Effectively”), subject to the Chancellery, took 
up work. Its declared aim is the use of “ex-ante-effectiveness analyses to gain empirical 
insights for the evaluation of alternative problem-solving approaches and to increase the 
effectiveness of policy measures” to which end it is supposed to run “pilot-projects” 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2015). However, to date the unit’s website7 mainly lists projects that 
                                                 
6
 http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/161308 [accessed 13 December 2019] 
7
 https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/wirksam-regieren/ [accessed 13 December 2019] 
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are survey studies and survey experiments. Merely two of the listed projects (campaigns for 
improved hygiene in hospitals and measles vaccinations) are policy evaluations and aim at 
impacting objective outcomes. 
Our study contributes to the emerging literature on experiment aversion and may 
inform the theoretical literature on the political economy of policy experimentation. While 
theoretical contributions have considered politicians’ incentives for measuring the impact of 
their policies, studies on experiment aversion have investigated people’s attitudes towards 
experimentation. 
Callander and Hummel (2014) study a setting in which there is uncertainty about the 
outcomes of different policies. Here, small-scale policy experiments may help policy-makers 
to learn where other desirable policies may lie as well as which policies should be avoided. 
Milner, Ollivier, and Simon (2014) consider a setting in which political parties differ both in 
preference parameters and in empirical beliefs about the consequences of different policies. 
Their setting gives rise to an incentive for the incumbent party to experiment because 
experimentation causes both parties to update their beliefs. This in turn influences both the 
incumbent and the opponent party’s future policy choices. Mukand and Rodrik (2005) 
consider a setting in which countries differ by their local state of the world, e.g. in terms of 
historical trajectories, institutional settings, social norms and geographical givens. 
Experimentation helps a country to find the combination of policies that produces the best 
results for its setting but is also costly. Imitating another country avoids the costs of 
experimentation but may lead a country to adopt a policy that is not appropriate for its 
context if it is not similar enough to the country it tries to imitate. 
Meyer et al. (2019) conduct a series of online between-subject vignette experiments 
with non-representative samples across different policy domains and find evidence that 
people rate a randomized experiment comparing two unobjectionable policies or treatments, 
neither of which was known to be superior, as less appropriate than simply implementing 
either option for everyone.
8
 They investigate several explanations for the effect and find that 
people tend to believe that consent is required to impose a policy on half of a population but 
not on the entire population, tend to have an aversion to controlled but not to uncontrolled 
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 The study’s conclusion is questioned by Mislavsky, Dietvorst, and Simonsohn (2019b) who argue that 
the effect arises due to its between-subjects design. They argue that in its setting lower support for the 
experiment may be fully accounted for by the fact that all people who find one of the options objectionable and 
the other acceptable will reject the experiment, while in the two treatments in which people are each presented 
with only one option, they will accept or reject this option independently of what they might think about the 
other option. This, Dietvorst et al. argue, amounts to comparing mean to minimum (instead of mean to mean) 
acceptance across treatments. 
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experiments and tend to fall prey to the illusion of knowledge, independently of their level of 
education or science literacy. Mislavsky, Dietvorst, and Simonsohn (2019a) conducted 
several online within-subject and pen-and-pencil vignette experiments with non-
representative samples in which participants evaluated the acceptability of either corporate 
policy changes or of experiments testing them. When all policy changes were deemed 
positive (i.e better than the status quo), subjects found the experiment acceptable even when 
it involved deception, unequal outcomes, and lack of consent. When one of the two policy 
changes was negative, the experiment was rated no less acceptable than the negative policy 
change. In contrast to the results by Meyer et al. (2019), experiments were rated no less 
acceptable than the simple average acceptability of the two policy changes involved in it if 
both policy changes were positive. However, experiments were rated less acceptable than the 
simple average acceptability of the two policy changes if one of them was negative. The 
authors conclude that they find no evidence for experiment aversion but merely for people’s 
tendency to overweigh negative attributes.  
Finally, this study relates to the growing economics literature that uses survey 
experiments to study determinants of the public’s policy preferences (e.g., Cruces et al. 2013, 
Kuziemko et al. 2015, Haaland and Roth 2017, Alesina et al. 2018a, Lergetporer et al. 2018, 
Roth et al. 2018). We extend this literature by applying the methodology of survey 
experiments to study public preferences for experimentation. 
Our study is the first to investigate experiment aversion with a clean and simple 
manipulation in a large and representative sample of the German population. This gives its 
findings strong external and internal validity and statistical power, and, consequently, allows 
us to derive generalizable conclusions about the effect of communication on the feasibility of 
scientific policy evaluation.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the opinion 
survey and the experimental design. Section 3 presents our main results and analyzes effect 
heterogeneities. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Data, Experimental Setup, and Empirical Model 
2.1 The Opinion Survey 
Our paper is based on data from the 2017 wave of the ifo Education Survey, an annual 
representative opinion survey on education policy in Germany. The survey comprised a total 
of 4,081 respondents, and our experiment was conducted among a randomly chosen 
7 
subsample of 2,225 respondents.
9
 Overall, the survey contained 34 questions on different 
topics of education policy and also collected information on respondents’ sociodemographic 
characteristics (see Table 1). Median completion time was 17 minutes, and item-non-
response was very small, for instance below 0.3 percent for our main outcome question of 
interest.
10
 Sampling and polling was carried out by Kantar Public, a renowned survey 
company, in April and May 2017.  
While rare in experimental analyses, survey representativeness is an important feature 
of our study which enables us to derive generalizable statements for the political economy of 
policy evaluation. Since computerized surveys do not cover the part of the population that 
does not use the internet, Kantar Public collected the data in two strata. First, people who use 
the internet (83 percent) were drawn from an online panel and answered all questions 
autonomously on their devices. Second, people who reported not to use the internet (17 
percent) were surveyed at their homes by trained interviewers. These respondents were 
provided with a tablet computer for completing the survey. This mixed-mode design assures 
that our findings are representative for the entire German population.  
All analyses presented in this paper use survey weights that were designed to match 
official statistics with respect to age, gender, parental status, school degree, federal state, and 
municipality size.  
2.2 The Survey Experiment 
Our goal is to investigate whether using the word “experiment” to describe the evaluation of 
educational reforms affects public support for reform evaluation. Therefore, we randomly 
assigned respondents to one of two versions of a question that elicits public preferences for 
education reform evaluation. The control-group version of the question was worded as 
follows: “Do you support or oppose that the effects of reforms in the education system, just 
like new medicine, should initially be tested on a small scale before they are implemented 
nationwide?” In contrast, the treatment-group question read as follows: “Do you support or 
oppose that the effects of reforms in the education system, just like new medicine, should 
initially be tested with experiments on a small scale before they are implemented 
nationwide?” Note that the question wording is identical across experimental groups, with the 
sole exception being that in the treatment group the words “with experiments” were added. 
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 The respondents not included in our analysis answered unrelated questions about education spending or 
the PISA test instead of answering a question on (experimental) policy evaluations.  
10
 Treatment status does not predict item non-response on the outcome variables (results available upon 
request). 
8 
Respondents were asked to select one of the following five answer categories: strongly 
support, somewhat support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose.
11
 
Similar to other recent survey-based economics papers, our outcome of interest is a self-
reported preference (e.g., Kuziemko et al. 2015, Falk et al. 2018). Reassuringly, recent 
evidence shows that survey-based measures correspond closely to actual political behaviour 
such as signing petitions or donating to charity (e.g., Haaland and Roth 2017, Alesina et al. 
2018b). 
We test whether observable characteristics of our respondents can predict assignment 
into experimental groups in Table 1. Column 1 reports the covariate means and standard 
deviations in brackets (for non-binary covariates) for the control-group version of the 
question. Column 2 reports coefficients from regressing each covariate on the treatment 
indicator. Overall, the table shows that there are small but significant differences (p<0.05) in 
only 3 out of 20 pairwise comparisons. In addition, regressing treatment status 
simultaneously on all listed covariates yields a p-value for joint significance of 0.411 (bottom 
part of Table 1). Thus, our randomization worked as intended. 
As insignificant coefficient estimates can either reflect true null effects or just a lack of 
statistical power, we report minimum detectable effect sizes (MDEs) in the results section. To 
compute MDEs with 80% power and α=0.05, we follow Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) and 
multiply standard errors by 2.8. 
2.3 Empirical Model 
We estimate the causal effects of using the word “experiment” on support for education-
reform evaluation with the following regression model: 
              
       (1) 
where    is respondent i’s preference for educational reform evaluation,    indicates whether 
respondent i received the version of the question contains the word “experiment”,    is a 
vector of control variables, and    is an error term which is uncorrelated with all right-hand 
side variables. The parameter of interest    represents the causal effect of using the words 
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 Appendix Figure A1 provides screenshots of the survey questions as they appeared on respondents’ 
devices. To prompt people to give a considered answer and to minimize the error of central tendency, the 
category “neither favor nor oppose” was placed below the other answer categories for both questions. We 
implemented a methodological experiment on another survey question (on granting teachers civil service 
protections) and found that the position of the neutral category does not change relative support and opposition 
towards the policy proposal (results available upon request).  
9 
“with experiments”. While further control variables are not required to identify the causal 
treatment effect because of random assignment, we include further controls in some 
specifications to increase the precision of our estimates, and to account for the slight 
imbalances reported in Table 1. Our main outcomes of interest are dummy variables coded 1 
if a respondent (strongly or somewhat) supports or opposes reform evaluations, and 0 else, 
but we also analyze effects on each of the five answer categories separately to investigate 
preference intensity. 
To analyze heterogeneous treatment effects by respondents’ background characteristics, 
we additionally employ the following regression model: 
                                       
                  (2) 
where           equals 1 if respondent i belongs to the respective subgroup, and 0 
otherwise. In this specification,    measures the treatment effect on non-members of the 
subgroup, and    measures the additional effect on the subgroup. 
3. Results 
This section first presents our main results on support for reform evaluation and the causal 
effect of using the word “experiment” to describe the evaluation, and then presents a 
heterogeneity analysis across sociodemographic subgroups.  
3.1 Main Results 
Table 2 depicts the results from regressions based on equation (1). Odd-numbered columns 
present estimates without controls, even-numbered columns include our set of 
sociodemographic control variables.
12
 A broad majority of respondents in the control-group 
version of the question (i.e., without mentioning the word “experiment”) of 75 percent 
supports the evaluation of education reform (see control mean). Only a small minority of 14 
percent opposes it. The remainder neither supports nor opposes it. In Appendix Table A1 we 
regress support for reform evaluation on respondents’ sociodemographic characteristics. 
Female respondents are less likely to support education reform evaluations, and more patient 
respondents are more likely to support them. The observation that all other coefficients in the 
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 We use linear probability models throughout the paper. (Ordered) probit models lead to the same 
qualitative results (available upon request). The controls are all variables listed in Table 1 with the exception of 
political preference; see notes to Table 2 for details.  
10 
table are insignificant indicates that high support for reform evaluation is a general 
phenomenon across most subgroups of the German population. 
The small and statistically insignificant coefficients on the treatment indicator show 
that using the phrase “experiment” to describe reform evaluations does not affect average 
support for - or average opposition against - the evaluation of educational reforms. Note that 
the estimated effects are very small and we are powered to detect treatment effects of 6 
percentage points in columns 1 and 2, and 5 percentage points in columns 3 and 4. Note that 
our MDEs would allow us to detect any majority shift in support for or opposition against the 
evaluation of educational reforms induced by the word “experiment”. Our heterogeneity 
analysis by response time below indicates that this precisely estimated zero effect is not due 
to respondents’ inattention. In sum, the vast majority of Germans supports the evaluation of 
educational reforms, even if this evaluation is clearly labelled with the “E-word”.  
Appendix Table A2 further investigates treatment effects on each of the five answer 
categories separately. For each answer categories, we find small and insignificant effects of 
using the word “experiment”, which shows that aggregating answer categories as in Table 2 
does not obfuscate treatment effects in individual answer categories. 
3.2 Effect Heterogeneities Across Socioeconomic Subgroups 
Next, we investigate the extent to which treatment effects differ across sociodemographic 
subgroups using the regression framework of equation (2). For each sociodemographic 
subgroup, Table 3 depicts treatment effects for its members. 
The fact that most coefficients reported in Table 3 are insignificant shows that almost 
no subgroup of the German population reacts adversely to the word “experiment”. In 
particular, we find no heterogeneous treatment effects by educational attainment, income, 
respondents’ information status about the German education system, and whether they think 
that the German school system performs well.
13
 Furthermore, we find no significant treatment 
effects for two groups that would be directly affected by an (experimental) evaluation 
process: Parents of children below age 18 years, and respondents working in the education 
sector. Interestingly, we also find no effect heterogeneity by proxies of respondents’ 
attention: Respondents with longer response times and those interviewed offline in the 
                                                 
13 We construct an information measure by using respondents’ answers to several guess questions on facts 
about the educational system. A respondent is classified as “informed” if her beliefs are closer to the correct 
values than those of the median respondent. To categorize respondents’ beliefs about the performance of the 
school system, we assume respondents have a positive evaluation of the school system if they say they would 
give schools in their local area one of the top two grades on a 6-point scale. 
11 
presence of an interviewer exhibit no differential treatment effects than their counterparts. 
This suggests that inattention cannot explain why we do not find an effect of using the word 
“experiment”. 
The only significant treatment effect heterogeneity that we detect is by respondents’ 
political leaning. Grouping partisans of the 6 major German parties
14
 into conservatives 
(partisans of the CDU/CSU, and the AFD), socialists (partisans of the SPD and Die Linke), 
progressives (partisans of the FDP and Die Grünen), and non-partisans, we find that using 
the word “experiment” to describe the evaluation process makes socialists significantly less 
likely (by 11 percentage points) to support reform evaluation. Support by conservatives, 
progressives, and non-partisans stays unchanged. The finding that treatment effects are 
homogeneous by sociodemographic background suggests that the sociodemographic 
composition of different partisan groups cannot account for the significant effect 
heterogeneities by political leaning. At the same time, the significant coefficients in Table 3 
need to be interpreted with some caution given the large number of hypotheses tested in the 
table, and the related risk of false-positive results. 
4. Conclusion 
We conducted a randomized survey experiment within a representative sample of more than 
1,900 respondents in Germany to investigate public support for (experimental) reform 
evaluation. To study the extent to which using the word “experiment” yields public backlash, 
we randomly assigned respondents to one of two versions of our question of interest: The 
control-group version elicited preferences for reform evaluation without using the word 
“experiment”, whereas the treatment-group version explicitly mentioned “with experiments” 
in the question. We find that public support for policy reform evaluation is generally high (75 
percent in favour) and is overall unaffected by using the word “experiment”. The treatment 
effects are very small (1-2 percentage points, depending on the specification), insignificant, 
and precisely estimated. We consider reporting these zero effects important since it is the first 
causal evidence on whether experimenters’ common practice to avoid the word “experiment” 
affects the public’s preferences, not least in light of widespread publication biases against 
null results (e.g., Franco et al. 2014). Further analyses reveal that left-leaning respondents are 
sensitive to the treatment variation. Their support for reform evaluation is significantly 
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 The categorization is based on the following question about the respondents‘ long-term party 
attachment: “Many people in Germany lean towards a particular political party in the long term, even if they 
occasionally also vote for another party. With which party do you sympathize in general?” 
12 
reduced when the words “through experiments” are added. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, 
we do not find a general aversion against the word “experiment” but our results also suggest 
that different political parties may face different constraints. 
Our results should, however, not be read as evidence in favour of or against public 
support for the randomized evaluation of policies. Policy experimentation may apply various 
methods, with randomized controlled trials (RCTs) being just one of them. Recent studies 
testing for aversion against randomization in non-representative samples have reached 
conflicting conclusions (Meyer et al. 2019, Mislavski, Dietvorst, and Simonsohn 2019a) and 
further evidence is needed. The word “experiment” is often used to describe trial-and-error 
strategies (e.g., Batory et al. 2018), studies in which subjects are not randomly assigned to 
treatment and control groups (List and Metcalfe 2014) or even qualitative case studies 
(Blanchenay and Burns 2016). While our paper is agnostic about the exact experimental 
method that citizens think of when being confronted with the word “experiment”, we do think 
that this is an interesting avenue for future research.  
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Figures and Tables 
Table 1: Summary statistics and balancing table 
 Mean [SD] Treatment effects on covariates  
 (1) (2) 
Age 50.1     [18.5] 0.001     (0.001) 
Female 0.505 0.031     (0.026) 
Born in Germany 0.940 0.092     (0.059) 
Municipality size 4.31   [1.8] -0.004    (0.007) 
Monthly household income 2324.1     [1471.8] 0.000     (0.000) 
Partner in household 0.552 0.020     (0.027) 
Has parent(s) with high degree 0.292 -0.018    (0.028) 
Works in education sector 0.079 0.065     (0.046) 
Parents of school-aged children 0.258 0.000     (0.029) 
Lives in West Germany 0.805 0.071**   (0.030) 
No or basic school degree 0.366 0.079***  (0.029) 
Middle school degree 0.306 -0.058**  (0.026) 
University entrance degree 0.328 -0.028    (0.027) 
University student 0.097 -0.054    (0.045) 
Employed 0.517 -0.012    (0.026) 
Unemployed/Retired 0.386 0.033     (0.028) 
Political leaning: conservative  0.336 0.018     (0.029) 
Political leaning: socialist 0.268 -0.027    (0.030) 
Political leaning: progressive 0.093 0.044     (0.044) 
Non-partisans 0.303 -0.012    (0.029) 
Risk tolerance 4.2     [2.5] -0.002    (0.005) 
Patience 6.0     [2.5] -0.005    (0.005) 
Offline-survey mode 0.169 0.038     (0.043) 
Observations 1,965 
F-Test for joint significance 
(p-value)  
0.466 
Notes: Column 1: Weighted group means (standard deviations of non-binary variables in brackets). Column 2: 
coefficients and standard errors of regressions of the respective covariate on the treatment indicator. Each cell 
represents a separate regression. Municipality size: categorical variable equal to 1 for "1 to 1.999 residents" to 7 
for "more than 500.000 residents". Observations might differ for individual rows due to missing values. 
Maximum number of observations: 1,965. Data source: ifo Education Survey 2017. Regressions weighted using 
survey weights. Data source: ifo Education Survey 2017. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 2: Effects of using the word “experiment” on preferences for reform evaluation 
 Support for reform evaluation   Opposition reform evaluation 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
„Experiment“ treatment -0.009 -0.015  0.019 0.021 
 (0.022) (0.023)  (0.018) (0.018) 
Covariates No Yes  No Yes 
Control mean 0.751  0.140 
Observations 1,957 1,902  1,957 1,902 
R
2 0.000 0.022  0.001 0.024 
Notes: OLS regressions. “Experiment” treatment: experimental treatments in the survey experiment. Dependent 
variable: Columns 1-2: Dummy variables 1 = “strongly support” or “somewhat support” reform evaluation, 0 
otherwise; columns 3-4: Dummy variables 1 = “strongly oppose” or “somewhat oppose” reform evaluation, 0 
otherwise. Residual category: “neither support nor oppose.” Control mean: mean of the outcome variable in the 
control group. Covariates include age, municipality size, income, risk tolerance, patience, and dummies for 
gender, born in Germany, living with partner in household, parents’ higher degree, working in the education 
sector, parent status, living in West Germany, highest school degree, employment status, and offline-survey 
mode. Data source: ifo Education Survey 2017. Regressions weighted by survey weights. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 3: Treatment effects in sociodemographic subgroups 
 Dependent variable: Support for reform evaluation 
Treatment effects for the following 
subgroups: 
(1) 
No or basic school degree 0.014 
 (0.037) 
Middle school degree 0.006 
 (0.042) 
University entrance degree -0.061* 
 (0.036) 
Income above median -0.014 
 (0.030) 
Well-informed about educ. system 0.007 
 (0.035) 
Positive evaluation of educ. system 0.016 
 (0.033) 
Works in education sector -0.038 
 (0.071) 
Response time above median -0.026 
 (0.035) 
Offline-survey mode -0.046 
 (0.061) 
Political leaning: conservative 0.058 
 (0.039) 
Political leaning: socialist -0.108*** 
 (0.041) 
Political leaning: progressive -0.012 
 (0.072) 
Non-partisans 0.003 
 (0.044) 
Notes: Each line represent the coefficient of a separate OLS regression. Reported coefficients are for interaction 
terms between the treatment indicator and the respective variables indicated in the left column. Dependent 
variable: Dummy variable 1 = “strongly support” or “somewhat support” reform evaluation, 0 otherwise. The 
table displays coefficients on the interaction term between treatment and subgroup indicators from estimates 
based on equation (2). Data source: ifo Education Survey 2017. Regressions weighted by survey weights. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: 
***
 p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.10. 
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Appendix Table A1: Who supports reform evaluations? 
 Dependent variable: Support for reform evaluation 
 (1) 
Age -0.001    (0.001) 
Female -0.062**  (0.031) 
Born in Germany 0.073     (0.074) 
Municipality size 0.003     (0.008) 
Monthly household income -0.000    (0.000) 
Partner in household -0.011    (0.033) 
Has parent(s) with high degree -0.021    (0.035) 
Works in education sector 0.015     (0.052) 
Parents of school-aged children -0.026    (0.035) 
Lives in West Germany 0.038     (0.038) 
Middle school degree 0.007     (0.041) 
University entrance degree 0.068     (0.051) 
University student 0.006     (0.057) 
Vocational track -0.022    (0.050) 
Academic track -0.050    (0.059) 
Unemployed/Retired 0.013     (0.038) 
Risk tolerance -0.001    (0.006) 
Patience 0.015**   (0.006) 
Offline-survey mode 0.088     (0.063) 
Constant 0.660***  (0.128) 
Observations 917 
R
2 0.0211 
Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variable: Dummy variable 1 = “strongly support” or “somewhat support” 
reform evaluation, 0 otherwise. Data source: ifo Education Survey 2017. Regressions weighted by survey 
weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: 
***
 p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.10. 
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Appendix Table A2: Effects of using the word “experiment” on preferences for reform 
evaluation: Five answer categories 
 Strongly 
support 
Somewhat 
support 
Neither 
support nor 
oppose 
Somewhat 
oppose 
Strongly 
oppose 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
„Experiment“ treatment -0.012 -0.002 -0.007 0.007 0.015* 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.016) (0.017) (0.008) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control mean 0.218 0.532 0.106 0.121 0.024 
Observations 1,902 
R
2 0.019 0.011 0.021 0.017 0.019 
Notes: OLS regressions. “Experiment” treatment: experimental treatments in the survey experiment. Dependent 
variables: Dummy variables 1 = respondent selected respective answer category, 0 otherwise. Control mean: 
mean of the outcome variable in the control group. Covariates include age, municipality size, income, risk 
tolerance, patience, and dummies for gender, born in Germany, living with partner in household, parents’ higher 
degree, working in the education sector, parent status, living in West Germany, highest school degree, 
employment status, and offline-survey mode. Data source: ifo Education Survey 2017. Regressions weighted by 
survey weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: 
***
 p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.10. 
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Appendix Figure A1: Screenshots of the survey questions 
Baseline version 
 
Experiment version 
 
Notes: Screenshots of the two versions of the question. The wording of the question in the two 
treatments only differs by whether it includes the worlds “mit Experimenten” (“with experiments”).  
